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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Response to State's Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying 
Proceedillgs 
In 2005, having spent nearly two years in jail awaiting trial and sentencing, eighteen-year-
old Sarah, who had not testified at trial said this: 
I loved my parents and I love my family. I'm deeply grieving the loss of my 
parents, as well as the loss of my family, my home, my friends and my 
community. 
I am very thankful for the love and support that my adopted family has given to 
me. With the guidance of the Lord and the continued love and support of those 
that believe in me, I hope to rebuild my life and prove that I can be a productive 
member of society. That's all I have to say. 
T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 2456, In. 21 - p. 2457, In. 5. 
While the state asserts that "[t]he evidence proving Johnson was involved in the murder 
of her parents was overwhelming," this is incorrect. Respondent's Brief at page 1. 
Nineteen hundred latent fingerprints were processed by the state's experts. None 
matched Sarah's. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3018, In. 14-15; p. 3068, In. 9-21. 
Starting shortly after the police arrived on the scene, Sarah's body was also repeatedly 
inspected and tested, but she did not have any blood on her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1818, In. 15 - p. 
1819, In. 16; p. 1858, In. 10-13; Vol. 4, p. 2249, In. 6-9; p. 2280, In. 11 - p. 2282, In. 8; p. 2472, 
In. 19-23; Vol. 6, p. 3653, In. 1-11; Vol. 7, p. 5032, In. 19-24; Vol. 8, p. 5754, In. 13. 
The absence of any blood on Sarah is exonerating because the bedroom and hallway were 
"covered with blood and flesh and brain material running up to the ceiling, across the ceiling of 
the bedroom, going towards the bathroom." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1658, In. 11-17. "Things were 
dripping off the wall and off the ceiling on the floor," T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1659, In. 7-10. The state's 
expert described the explosion of Diane Johnson's head as a "massive amount of eruption" with 
"massive energy." He described bone and tissue "hitting and ricocheting off and coming back to 
that area. That's how powerful it gets." T Tr. Vol 6, p. 4169, In. 14-19, p. 4172, In. 10-14. Dr. 
Grey, a pathologist, testified that Alan, shot in his lung, could have been coughing out blood in a 
high-velocity spatter pattern. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5376, In. 21-25. The robe had blood from both 
Diane and Alan Johnson in patterns indicating that the blood was moving very quickly at high 
energy when it was deposited. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4205, In. 9-17. The state's expert testified that 
"one thing, agin, that can't ever be changed, it's a fact that can't be taken away, is the evidence 
that the robe is covered in a (sic) waist-down with the blood of Diane 10hnson and Alan Johnson 
in a high velocity particulate." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, In. 14-18. The state's expert testified, "The 
shooter in this case did block the [blood] spatter coming back, yes." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4251, In. 5-
6. 
The T-shirt and pajama bottoms Sarah was wearing were carefully inspected and tested, 
but did not have any blood on them. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3188, In. 18 - p. 3189, In. 5. 
The robe had gunshot residue on it. Supp. T Tr. p. 206, In. 24. There was no gunshot 
residue on Sarah or her pajamas. See T Tr. 
Fibers were found on the rifle, but they did not come from any material that was matched 
to Sarah's clothing or anything belonging to Sarah or even the Johnson household. T Tr. Vol. 6, 
p. 4243, In. 12-1. 
The robe also had DNA on it, including DNA in a piece of human tissue which belonged 
to a male other than Bruno Santos or Alan Johnson. R Vol. 4, p. 1036. So, this man other than 
Bruno or Alan had lost body tissue while wearing or in very close proximity to the robe. 
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The state posited that a comforter was tightly tucked over Diane's head at the time she 
was shot blocking her blood from the shooter. Supp T Tr. p. 197, In. 13-20. But, it did not 
explain why the robe the shooter wore was covered with Diane's blood. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, In. 
14-18. The state also failed to explain how Diane had tucked a comforter in over her own head 
so tightly that it took force for Officer Kirtley to pull it down when he entered the bedroom. T 
Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5223, In. 10 - p. 5225, In. 6. Further, the state failed to collect the comforter as 
evidence so that its theory could be tested, because its investigators did not see any relevance in 
it. In fact, both Officer Kirtley and the officer in charge of the crime scene, Stu Robinson, 
testified that they looked at the comforter at the scene and did not see a bullet hole in it. T Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 1946, In. 16-22; Vol. 7, p. 4680, In. 24 - p. 4683, In. 23; p. 5223, In. 19-p. 5225, In. 6. 
And, the state offered no explanation at all as to why Alan's blood was on the rifle and the robe, 
but not on Sarah. See Supp T Tr. p. 175, In. 10 - p. 218, In. 10; p. 313, In. 13 - p. 344, In. 12. 
The state found the scope from the rifle used to kill the 10hnsons on the guesthouse bed. 
T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1842, In. 16-18. The rifle, scope and ammunition all had latent fingerprints on 
them, but those fingerprints were not Sarah's. The existence of the fingerprints was inconsistent 
with the state's theory that Sarah used the rifle while wearing gloves, as the handling would have 
obscured older prints. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3028, In. 10-12; p. 3044, In. 15-21; p. 3052, In. 11-21. 
The state tells this Court on appeal that Sarah asked for the key to a gun safe two days 
before her parents were murdered. Respondent's Brief at page 7. The state did not also tell this 
Court that Sarah's brother Matthew, who was a witness for the state, testified that Sarah kept 
jewelry in the safe, an innocent reason for a request for the key. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4562, In. 15-24. 
Sarah, sixteen years old, of average or low average intelligence and ability to learn, 
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orphaned through a violent event, was repeatedly questioned. She was questioned by experts in 
interrogation repeatedly on the day she lost her parents. She was questioned in the absence of 
counsel. She was questioned right after having been given a hyponotic drug. She was 
questioned many times. She was accused of patricide. But, despite the state's very best efforts, 
she did not confess. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, In. 1; Vol. 4, p. 2177, In. 1 - p. 2179, In. 5; p. 2425, In. 
23 - p. 2444, In. 14; p. 2488, In. 2-14; p. 2446, In. 23 - p. 2452, In. 1, p. 2446, In. 8 - p. 2454, In. 
19;p.1544,ln.3-12; Vol.4,p.2176,ln.l0-15;p.1749,ln.l-p.1750,ln.l;p.2099,ln.23-p. 
2102, In. 23; p. 2430, In. 11-13. Vol 1, p. 654, In. 9 - p. 655, In. 21; Vol. 4, p. 2424, In. 20 - p. 
2425, In. 12; Vol. 5, p. 3368, In. 8 - p. 3371, In. 5; p. 3377, In. 1 - p. 3378, In. 6, Vol. 4, p. 2179, 
In. 6-20. 
The evidence against Sarah was not overwhelming as the state has asserted in its brief in 
this appeal. Respondent's Brief p. 1. 
Clues to the state's own assessment of its evidence against Sarah are evident in the way 
the case was handled. 
The police questioned Sarah without counsel's presence stating that they had not received 
the faxed letters from Sarah's attorney alerting them to his representation and claiming that they 
did not know that she was represented even though she made statements that she had been told 
not to talk to them by an attorney. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 578, In. 10-p. 580, In. 14. 
The police kept Sarah in the jail as a favor to her family, even though she was not under 
arrest or charged. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2445, In. 1-22. 
After she was actually charged and arrested, Sarah was kept in adult facilities in clear 
violation of the law - even after information surfaced indicating that she may have been raped by 
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an adult male inmate. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 428, In. 22-p. 431, In. 10; p. 445, In. 9-20; Vol. 9, p. 6260, 
In. 4-p. 6264, In. 3. 
The prosecutor admitted early on that in an "informal conversation" he told state officials, 
including those working in the fingerprint lab, "Well, they're [defense investigators and counsel] 
not going to be talking to you without me or an agent present." But then, in response to a defense 
motion to compel the state to cease and desist instructing state employees not to speak to the 
defense, T R Vol. 3, p. 463-469, he stated that he understood that the ethics rules prohibited him 
from prohibiting people from talking to the defense. T Tr. Vol. 2, p. 840, In. 12 - p. 842, In. 16. 
The state sent corrections officers to talk to April Montano, a defense witness, to tell her 
that if she did not tell the state what it wanted to be told that she would lose her probation and let 
her know that even just talking to the defense investigator had gotten her into trouble with the 
state. According to the witness, these state officers called her seven times regarding her intent to 
testifY. She testified that she felt "very threatened" by the state's actions. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4975, In. 
15 - p. 4976, In. 12; p. 4986, In. 12-13; p. 4996, In. 13-18. 
At the opening of the trial, the state committed misconduct which resulted in an 
objection, motion for mistrial, and a curative instruction, in accompanying its opening statement 
with a projected photograph of Sarah over which it projected a big banner reading guilty. Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 1504, In. 4 - p. 1511, In. 5. 
At trial, the state floated the theory that Sarah had been taught in high school debate how 
to commit a murder and get away with it. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3799, In. 12 - p. 3809, In. 19. 
The state also claimed that the bruises in the following photograph of Sarah's left 
shoulder are consistent with the firing of a rifle. Respondent's Brief at page 4. 
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State's Trial Ex. 238, admitted, T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2248, In. 24. 
Common experience is that someone shooting a rifle would not be bruised on the top of 
her shoulder as depicted in this photograph. Any bruising would be on the front, near the armpit, 
not the top of the shoulder. Further, the bruising the state relies on is on Sarah's left shoulder, 
but Sarah's brother testified that she is right-handed and the state had no evidence that she had 
ever shot a rifle left-handed. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5754, In. 13. 
The state took the jury on an extended field trip to see the 10hnsons' house even though 
according to the state's own statement the house had been "totally changed." Tr. Vol. 3, In. 19-
25. According to both the judge's statements and the jury instructions, the house was not 
evidence and the juror's observations of the house were not to be taken into consideration in 
arriving at a verdict. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2361, In. 7-p. 2265, In. 15. Nonetheless, the state argued 
effectively to the judge that Sarah should be excluded from this field trip as her presence might 
prejudice the state's case. Sarah, who was on trial and had at stake a fixed life sentence was the 
only person who was excluded from this viewing, even though she also was the only person who 
could tell her attorney, and thereby the jury, how the house had been altered since her parents had 
been killed. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1920, In. 18 - p. 1921, In. 9. This raises the serious possibility that 
the trip was planned only to evoke emotion and a verdict based on emotion and not admissible 
evidence. 
The state engaged in character assassination to convict Sarah. A list of Sarah's sins 
presented to the jury included that she was selfish, defiant, self-absorbed, obsessed with money, 
obsessed with her hair and nails, went out with older boyfriends and had sex with them, and was 
less than honest. Supp. T Tr. p. 177, In. 2 - p. 178, In. 6, p. 215, In. 14-17. 
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In rebuttal, to explain the lack of blood on Sarah, the state argued that the robe was not 
covered in blood and therefore the shooter would not be covered in blood. Supp. Tr. p. 322, In. 
3-7. This argument was made despite their own expert's testimony that the robe was covered 
from the waist down in blood and the fact that the robe could not have covered Sarah's head. T 
Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, In. 14-18. 
The state also argued in rebuttal that the Vavolds did not contact Doug Nelson, whom the 
state characterized as "an ambulance-chasing lawyer" because they had never heard of him, even 
though the evidence showed that Ms. Vavold had recorded his name in her journal and even 
though there was no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Nelson is an "ambulance chaser,,,j rather, he 
was contacted by Lorna Kolash, Sarah's godmother, who realized that Sarah needed counsel. T 
Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3377, In. 16 - p. 3378, In. 6; Vol. 8, p. 5557, In. 10-20. Supp. T Tr. p. 326, In. 8-12. 
Additionally, there were many things missing in the case. The state tried to explain the 
lack of blood on Sarah's head and face by arguing that there had been a shower cap at the house 
earlier which she could have worn on her head. The state did not try to explain how a shower 
cap on the head could keep a face free of blood. And, the state did not produce the shower cap. 
Supp. T Tr. p. 324, In. 4 - p. 325, In. 2. 
Likewise, the state did not produce any fingerprint evidence from the garbage can lid -
even though whoever put the robe in the can would have had to touch the lid. T Tr. Vol. 5122, 
In. 15-17. 
And, the state did not produce the tool used to remove the scope from the rifle -
J Mr. Nelson, who is not an "ambulance chaser," is a former Blaine County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
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something that surcly would havc bcen on Sarah's person or in the garbage or on the bed if Sarah 
was the guilty person. On the other hand, if someone else had come to thc house and removed 
the scope, that person could have tucked the tool into a pocket and len with it. 
Finally, after the conviction, the state withheld exculpatory evidence - Sarah would have 
never discovered that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were matched to those on the rifle, scope, 
and ammunition box, but for Mr. Kerchusky calling Ms. Eguren and Ms. Eguren letting the 
information "slip out." EH Tr. p. 767, In. 10-14. A state certain of the validity of its conviction 
and/or interested injustice would not have an interest in concealing exculpatory evidence from 
the defendant. 
The evidence was not overwhelming. Had it been overwhelming, the state would have 
not been afraid to allow Sarah to have counsel present when it questioned her, would not have 
tried to frighten her witnesses into not testifYing, would not have forbade state employees from 
speaking to the defense team, would not have had Sarah sleep at the jail before she was even 
charged (Sun Valley surely has no shortage of beds outside the jail that could have been used for 
the convenience of the family), would not have kept her in an adult facility contrary to law, 
would not have organized a trip to the house during trial which excluded Sarah even though the 
house had been completely remodeled, would not have committed misconduct in the initial 
opening statement by portraying Sarah with a guilty banner over her face, would not have 
resorted to character assassination or theories like children can learn how to commit murder and 
get away with it in debate class, and would not have had to resort to the shower cap theory. All 
these actions are consistent with law enforcement personnel and attorneys uncertain of their 
ability to obtain evidence and a good conviction consistent with their theory of the case. 
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All of these actions are inconsistent with the state's claim on appeal that the evidence 
against Sarah was overwhelming. 
B. Sarah was Denied the Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial Due to 
Counsel's Failure to Discover and Present Evidence that the Prints on the 
Rifle, Scope, Bullet and Insert were Fresh and Thus COlltradictOlY of the 
State's Theory that Sarah Murdered her Parents. 
1. The State has Confused "Fresh" with "Less than a Year Old. " 
As set out in the Opening Brief, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit testimony 
from Mr. Kerchusky that the fingerprints on the rifle and scope were fresh prints. Opening Brief 
p.30-47. 
The state's initial response to this argument is that counsel's performance was not 
deficient because counsel did elicit testimony from Mr. Kerchusky at trial that the prints were 
less than a year old, a status which the state equates with "fresh." Respondent's Briefp. 16. 
However, "fresh" is not synonymous with "less than a year ald." Consider game tracks. 
Consider a gallon of milk. 
Mr. Kerchusky testified at the evidentiary hearing that his conclusion that the prints on 
the scope, rifle, and the insert from the ammunition box were fresh was based on several factors. 
Mr. Kerchusky's underlying analysis undoubtedly began with the premise he was asked about at 
the trial - that prints rarely last more than a year. However, his opinion that the prints were 
"fresh" as opposed to just less than a year old was based on the following other factors which 
were vital to establishing that the person who placed the prints on the rifle, scope, bullet, and 
insert was the person who killed the 10hnsons and most certainly was not Sarah: 
1. The location and direction of the prints on the scope were consistent with removing it 
from the rifle, indicating that they were placed there when the scope was removed from the rifle 
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just prior to the murders; 
2. Prior to the day of the murders, the scope and rifle had been covered with clothing 
which would have wiped off or obscured any older prints; 
3. Mr. Speegle inspected the rifle and scope just two weeks prior to the wedding which 
immediately preceded the murders and the scope was attached. This is significant for three 
reasons: a) The prints made in removing the scope could not have been placed there prior to Mr. 
Speegle's inspection; b) After Mr. Speegle's inspection, he wrapped the rifle and scope with 
clothing which would have obscured older prints; and c) Mr. Speegle's prints were not on the 
rifle or scope which showed that the rewrapping obscured older prints. 
4. The prints on the scope were not etched. 
5. The print on the bullet could be lifted off. 
6. The insert had not been touched for 10 years prior to the murders, so the print on it 
had to have been made at the time of the murders. 
EH Tr. p. 825, In. 22 - p.831, In. 1. 
Prints less than a year old tell the jury nothing about the murders. Fresh prints, made 
sometime between Mr. Speegle's inspection of the rifle and scope and the murders tell the jury 
that someone handled the rifle, scope, bullet, and insert just prior to the murders and given no 
one else's prints were found, the prints belonged to the murderer. 
The state says that Sarah has a "fixation" with the word "fresh." Respondent's Brief, p. 
16. And, she does - because "fresh" prints are related to the murders. Prints less than a year old 
could have come from anyone at any time in the 364 days preceding the murders and be totally 
unrelated to the murders. This is an extremely important distinction and the failure to present the 
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expert testimony regarding the freshness of the prints was deficient performance. 
C. The State's Fall-Back Argument Fails 
After arguing that "fresh" is no different from "less than a year old," the state asserts that 
even if counsel should have used the word "fresh" at trial, there was no prejudice because 
counsel argued to the jury that the person who left the prints was the murderer. Respondent's 
Brief at page 17. This fall-back argument fails. 
Sarah's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not based upon the fact that trial 
counsel did not use the word "fresh" to refer to the fingerprints. It is based upon the fact that 
counsel was ineffective in not presenting expert testimony that the fingerprints were fresh. If 
counsel had merely referred to the prints as "fresh" in his questioning of Mr. Kerchusky and not 
elicited that fresh is distinct from less than a year old and that fresh prints had to have been 
placed on the rifle, scope, bullet, and insert sometime after the wedding and before the murders, 
that also would have been ineffective - because it is only that expert testimony that links the 
prints to the murderer. 
Second, the fact that counsel argued the theory to the jury that the prints were left by the 
murderer without the evidence to support the argument does not erase any prejudice from the 
failure to present the evidence. The jury was specifically instructed that counsels' arguments are 
not evidence. T Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6083, In. 24 - p. 6084, In. 4. In fact, failing to present evidence 
and then making an argument unsupported by the evidence increases the prejudice. That sort of 
sloppy advocacy persuades a jury that the defense argument is not creditworthy because it is 
unsupported by evidence. Not only is that particular jury argument undercut, but the credibility 
of the rest of the defense is undercut once counsel establishes himself as someone not to be 
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trusted. 
D. The Newly Discovered Fingerprint Evidence was Material 
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 51-52, the newly discovered evidence that 
Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the rifle, scope, bullet and ammunition box is material. 
The state responds to this argument of materiality writing: 
... This argument is predicated on Johnson's theory being true in the first 
instance. If Johnson's allegations regarding Hill were, in fact, true, then her claim 
of materiality may have merit. Because the district court expressly rejected the 
factual asse11ions underlying Johnson's materiality claim (R., Vol. 7, p. 1863), her 
argument necessarily fails. 
Respondent's Brief at p. 22. 
The findings and conclusions relating to the newly discovered evidence are at pages 
1919-1927 of Volume 7 of the Clerk's Record. On page 1922, the court does make the finding 
that it could not accept the theory that Christopher Hill was the unknown killer. However, as 
noted in Sarah's Opening Brief, the question relevant for the district court and for this Court in 
reviewing the district court is not whether either court is persuaded that Mr. Hill killed the 
Johnsons. Rather, the relevant question is whether the newly discovered evidence would have 
raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors about the state's evidence against Sarah. 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976). "Whether a fact is material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Stevens, 
146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443,180 
P.3d 476, 482 (2008). 
In Stevens, the Court considered whether a video of various objects falling down stairs 
was properly admitted in a murder trial involving the death of a child. The state's witness used 
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the video to illustrate his testimony that the child could not have received the fatal injuries in 
falling down stairs. Stevens argued that the evidence was not relevant and admissible because it 
did not accurately depict any issues in the case. After noting that whether a fact is material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties, the Supreme Court 
wrote: 
The video was relevant and admissible as it was used to illustrate [the expert's] 
testimony. Here, Steven's defense was that Casey's injuries were caused by his falling 
down the stairs and landing on the hardwood floor at the bottom. The issue for the jury to 
determine was whether Stevens caused Casey's injuries and death. Therefore, whether it 
was possible for Casey's injuries to have come from such a fall, as Stevens claimed, was 
a material issue to the case. The video was illustrative of [the expert's] testimony, and 
[the] expert testified that he used the video to understand the principles involved and in 
his analysis of whether Casey's injuries could have come from a fall down the stairs. 
ld., at 144,191 P.3d at 222. 
"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the consequential facts[,], Black's 
Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed. 1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal 
theories presented by the parties." State v. Yakovac, supra. 
The state is making the same error that the district court made in this case and the same 
error as addressed in Stevens - the question is not whether the theory that the evidence goes to is 
ultimately found to be true or not. The question of materiality is whether the evidence in 
question is logically related to the theory. If the evidence is related to the theory, it is material -
whether or not the ultimate fact finder determines that the theory is true or false. 
Here the evidence that Christopher Hill's fingerprints were on the rifle, scope, 
ammunition and ammunition box is logically related to the defense theory that Sarah never 
touched those items and was not guilty and is also logically related to the state's theory - insofar 
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as it absolutely undercuts it - that Sarah was the last person to touch those items. 
The state concludes its brief argument against materiality by stating that if Sarah's 
allegations about Christopher are true, then the claim of materiality may have merit. 
Respondent's Brief at page 22. This statement demonstrates that the state is in agreement that 
the evidence of Hill's fingerprints is logically related to the defense theory of the case. Given the 
logical relationship, the evidence was material. 
E. The Newly Discovered Evidence Would Probably Result in an Acquittal. 
Sarah's Opening Brief sets out the reasons why the newly discovered evidence would 
have probably resulted in an acquittal. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 52-65. 
The state's first response is that the newly discovered evidence that Hill's prints were on 
the rifle, scope, ammunition and ammunition box would not have probably resulted in an 
acquittal because the prints went to eliminate Hill as a suspect. Respondent's Brief p. 22. This 
argument ignores the fact that Hill had no provable alibi and testified that he last touched the 
rifle, scope, and ammunition some three years before the murders, yet Mr. Kurchusky testified 
that the prints identified as his were fresh and most certainly less than a year old. Given this 
inconsistency between the facts and Mr. Hill's assertions, the identification of Hill as the person 
who had last touched the rifle did not eliminate him as a suspect, but rather made him the 
suspect. 
The state's second response is that this Court should not consider any connection between 
Hill and Sylten in its consideration of whether the newly discovered fingerprint evidence would 
have probably produced an acquittal because this argument was not presented below. 
In general appellate review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were 
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presented in the district court. Wattenbarger v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 323, 
249 P .3d 961, 976 (2010). "Appellate courts follow this rule because it would be unfair to 
overrule the district court on issues not presented to it on which it did not have an opportunity to 
rule." Id., 150 Idaho at 324, 249 P.3d at 977. However, of course, there are exceptions to this 
rule. 
Judicial efficiency drives some of the exceptions. Eighth Amendment arguments are 
routinely considered even when they have not been made in the district court . 
. . . Were we to refuse to consider this variety of Eighth Amendment challenge 
because it was not preserved below, more litigation would be spurred in the trial 
courts as defendants sought to raise the issue through a Rule 35 motion or an 
application for post-conviction relief. In our judgment, the similarity of the 
Eighth Amendment and state law challenges to the length of sentences, and the 
interest of judicial efficiency, call for consideration of the two issues together on 
appeal even if the Eighth Amendment attack on the length of the sentence was not 
made in the trial court .... 
State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 71 P.3d 1088 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Concern for fundamental fairness and the importance of due process drives some of the 
other exceptions. Errors resulting in the denial of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to a 
fair trial in a fair tribunal may be heard on appeal even though there was no objection below. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,976 (2010). 
Likewise when a restriction of appellate review has a potential for a negative impact on 
society as a whole, an exception applies. State v. Clinton, Idaho P.3d _, Slip Op. 
August 20,2012, p. 13 (Ct. App. 2012). 
And, of course, "[i]f a district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, [the 
Appellate] Court will affirm the order upon the correct theory." State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 
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373,93 P.3d 696, 704 (2004), quoting McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 
(1999) (citing State v. Avelar. 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997)). Presumably, 
this exception is grounded in concerns for justice and judicial efficiency. 
In this case, the claim that the newly discovered evidence of Hill's fingerprint 
identification required a new trial, including the sub-claim that the newly discovered evidence 
would probably lead to an acquittal, was clearly before the district court. As the state points out 
in its brief at page 28, the court noted that it had reviewed thousands of pages of trial transcripts 
and reviewed all of the evidence. And, the court specifically considered the theory that Hill was 
the murderer. R Vol. 7, p. 1922, paragraph 115. So, the argument that Hill was the murderer, 
was in fact raised below. 
Moreover, even if every nuance of the argument was not expressed by Sarah's counsel 
below, concerns for judicial efficiency and justice allow those nuances to be considered now. 
Matters which were not sufficiently raised in this initial petition will likely be made part of the 
successive petition2 and can be more expeditiously dealt with now rather than later. And, the 
axiomatic importance of due process and fairness militates for consideration of all nuances and 
refinements of the arguments in this case. 
The state next argues that even if this Court considers any connection between Hill and 
Sylten, it should not find it of any import to this appeal because it is "farfetched" and "specious" 
and would not have produced an acquittal. Respondent's Brief at page 24. 
But, the connection between Hill and Sylten is no more farfetched and specious than the 
2 A DNA/Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raising claims which were not 
raised in the initial petition was filed by Sarah on April 9, 2012. 
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state's theory of this case - that a sixteen year old with no history of violence would shoot her 
sleeping mother in the head, be undeterred by the horrible sickening explosion, shoot her father 
in the chest as he reached out to her, manage to avoid all blood and gunshot residue, outwit 
interrogations undoubtedly carefully tailored to obtain incriminating confessions under incredibly 
stressful situations, all with only her high school debate class and some crime novels for 
instruction. While the connection between Hill and Sylten is, as will be explained below, not so 
weak as the state would have this Court believe, even a weak connection would be sufficient to 
undermine the state's ability to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and would probably result 
in an acquittal. 
Further, in its brief, the state makes arguments unsupported by the record. The state 
asserts that there was no evidence that Christopher Hill moved the guns into the guesthouse, 
much less that he knew the location of the guns there. Respondent's Brief at page 25. However, 
in fact, Mr. Speegle and Mr. Hill both testified that Mr. Hill had helped Mr. Speegle move his 
possessions, which included the gun, into the guesthouse. Tr. Transcript Vol. 4, p. 2707, In. 14-
22; EH Tr. p. 938, In. 1-3; p. 941, In. 1-6; p. 964, In. 10-12. And, although the state cites Mel 
Speegle's testimony that Mr. Hill did not have access to the guesthouse to his knowledge, 
Respondent's Brief at page 8, Mr. Hill testified that he had been at the Johnson house at least 
twice. Moreover, the guesthouse and main house were unlocked and therefore open to anyone, 
including Mr. Hill, on the day of the murders. EH Tr p. 964, In. 5 - p. 965, In. 4; T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 
1669, In. 7-l3; p. 1727, In. 6-10; Vol. 4, p. 2692, In. 14-16. 
The state next argues that Sylten could not have intimate knowledge of the Johnson house 
from cleaning it. Respondent's Brief at page 25-26. But, common experience of those who have 
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cleaned houses is that cleaning a house even once gives a very intimate understanding of the 
home and its inhabitants. See for example, Louise Rafkin, Other People's Dirt: A 
1 lousecleaner 's Curious Adventures, (1998) - quote from back cover, "Alone in a house, I piece 
together strands of life stories as if! were an archaeologist, the home a midden. I know who has 
sex with whom, and how often (condoms in the bathroom, stray hairs on the pillow). I don't read 
diaries, I read clues. I am there when the answering machine picks up ... " 
The state also argues that there was no evidence that Sylten would have a motive to harm 
the Johnsons because there was no evidence that her parole status was in jeopardy. Respondent's 
Brief at page 26. However, the state's own officer, Captain Fuller with the Blaine County 
Sheriff: testified at trial that both Janet Sylten and her boyfriend Russ Nuxoll were concerned 
about talking to him because they were worried about endangering Janet's parole status. Tr. 
Trial p. 2889, In. 4-6; p. 2895, In. 24 - p. 2896, In. 2. There was ample proof of Sylten's belief 
that her parole status was in jeopardy, and it is that belief, rather than the validity of that belief, 
that is relevant in assessing whether Sylten had a motive to harm the Johnsons. 
The state also asserts that Robin Lehat denied that there was any animosity between 
Sylten and the Johnsons. Respondent's brief at page 26. However, Robin actually testified that 
Janet used foul language when asked about the lotion missing from the Johnson house, was 
upset, refused to go settle the matter peacefully, and wound up frightening Robin so much that 
Robin forcefully evicted Janet and then went to the police and told them she felt threatened by 
Sylten and Nuxoll, whom she described as being of bad character. Indeed, after her report to the 
police, Robin changed her locks but Sylten and Nuxoll broke into her house anyway and stole 
some things. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 3775, In. 1 - p. 3779, In. 24. 
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The state further argues that "the identification of Hill's prints, however, does nothing to 
show 10hnson 'was not the one who fired the weapon that morning' anymore than the existence 
of unidentified prints or Speegle's prints would show such a thing." Respondent's Brief at page 
27. The state does not explain why this is so. And, it is difficult to see how the identification of 
the person who left his fingerprints on the rifle between the time Mel Speegle examined it two 
weeks before the murders and the murders, and indeed left his prints on the scope as he removed 
the scope just prior to the murders, does not exonerate Sarah. 
The state also argues that it would make no sense for Mr. Hill to leave his prints at the 
scene. Respondent's Brief at page 28. However, at the time of the murders, Christopher Hill 
knew that the government did not have his prints in the AFIS system and thus it could be 
perfectly sensible for him not to worry about leaving them behind. And, of course, the state 
would not make this argument if it had been Sarah's prints it found on the rifle. The state 
examined 1900 latent fingerprints in order to find the killer, not to eliminate as suspects those 
whose prints it found. 
The state also argues that it did not make sense that Mr. Hill could set up the scene inside 
the 10hnson home without waking the inhabitants. However, the evidence at trial was that the 
10hnsons had indeed been awakened in the night by people in the yard. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1529, In. 
10-22; p. 1531, In. 8-12; p. 1561, In. 4-7; p. 2095, In. 6 - p. 2098, In. 8; Vol. 4, p. 2434, In. 10 - p. 
2435, In. 23; p. 2694, In. 16-24. Furthermore, the items could have been left in Sarah's room 
after she fled the house. There was a time lag of many minutes between Sarah's fleeing and the 
arrival of the neighbors and police at the house. 
The state's final argument, at pages 28-29 of its brief is that it is clear that the court was 
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aware of the controlling legal standards and applied them properly as evidenced by the fact that 
the court noted that it had spent significant hours reviewing the transcripts, the testimony, the 
briefs and the evidence. The state's argument is illogical. The fact that the court spent a lot of 
time on this case does not guarantee that the court applied the correct standards. 
In denying Sarah's motion for an an-est of judgment, the trial judge stated that the 
convictions were sound because it was not reasonable to believe that "somebody off of the street 
could come" and find the gun and bullets and know the house well enough to commit the crimes. 
Tr. Supplemental Tr. p. 449, In. 9-17. (The state also placed importance prior to Hill's 
identification as the source of the prints on the fact that the prints belonged to an unknown 
person with no known ties to the 10hnson home. Supp T Tr. p. 317, In. 22 - p. 318, In. 4.) What 
is significant is that now it is not someone off the street leaving the fingerprints. It is an 
identified man who has an obvious connection to the household. 
Under these circumstances, the newly discovered evidence ofMr. Hill's identity would 
have caused a reasonable doubt leading to Sarah's acquittal and counsel's deficient performance 
in not eliciting expert testimony that the prints on the tools of the murder were not only less than 
a year old, but were fresh, was prejudicial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the Opening Brief and above, Sarah asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with directions to enter judgment in favor 
of Sarah, vacate the convictions and grant a new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this£ day of September, 2012. 
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